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A Methodological Critique of The Louisiana Supreme
Court in Question: An Empirical and Statistical Study
of the Effects of Campaign Money on the Judicial
Function
Robert Newman*
JanetSpeyrer**
Dek Terrell***
I. INTRODUCTION

Vernon Palmer and John Levendis offer a rather confusing and
contradictory paper on the impact of campaign contributions on
voting behavior by Louisiana Supreme Court justices.' The first
two sentences provide a very good example of the paper's
fundamental flaws. The first sentence asserts that "little" literature
exists to guide their study, ignoring over twenty-five years of
scholarly work directly related to the question of interest.2 The
second sentence provides the paper's central thesis-that it
supplies3 statistical evidence that contributions have influenced
justices. Yet a careful reading of the literature suggests that this
paper contains no such evidence. In an even more puzzling twist,
footnote 14 of Palmer and Levendis' (hereafter the authors are
referred to as P&L) paper states that it will assert no such causal
relationship.4 Our assessment is the authors have made a serious
error in methodology and their conclusions, therefore, should not
go unchallenged. Further, this methodological mistake may be
compounded by serious errors made by the authors in the
construction of their data.
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II. PRIOR RESEARCH ON CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND VOTING
DECISIONS

The first step in any academic study is a careful review of the
relevant literature. The first sentence of the P&L paper begins with
the observation that, "[t]he effect of campaign contributions on
judicial decision making has been the subject of widespread
interest and debate, but little empirical research." 5 Like much of
the paper, the first sentence misses the mark. In fact, there is
extensive literature in economics investigating the impact of
campaign contributions on the decisions of recipients.
Understanding the problems with the P&L paper requires first
placing it in the context of the literature.
While most of the extant evidence comes from empirical
research on the relationship between campaign contributions and
decisions of legislators, the methodological issues are identical for
examining the same relationship with respect to decisions made by
judges. Beginning with Henry Chappell's seminal paper, 6 the
accepted approach for empirical research on this topic must
explicitly recognize the probable simultaneity between the effect of
campaign contributions on judicial decisions and the effect of
judicial decisions on campaign contributions.7 His paper is of
particular importance because it reveals a fatal flaw in the P&L
analysis and points to the appropriate methodology the authors
should have employed for estimation of this type of model. The
necessity of addressing the simultaneity issue was explicitly stated
in an influential study by Thomas Stratman,8 which states in the
introduction: "All studies addressing the question of whether
5. Id. at 1292.
6. Henry W. Chappell, Campaign Contributions and Congressional
Voting. A SimultaneousProbit-TobitModel, 64 REv. ECON. & STAT. 77 (1982).
7. Chappell's contribution is among the first articles to appear when one
searches Google Scholar under "contributions" and "voting." Google Scholar
Search Results, http://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=contributions+and+voting&
hl=en&lr=-&btnG=-Search (last visited Oct. 22, 2008). As to Chappell's Campaign
Contributions piece, Google Scholar shows 145 citations to this article alone.
Google Scholar Citation Search Results, http://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=
en&lr=-&safe=off&cites=2051836317387457909 (last visited Oct. 22, 2008).
Many subsequent studies reference his methodology, and a number of those
appear in the top-rated journals in both economics and political science. See, e.g.,
Robert Baldwin & Christopher Magee, Is Trade Policy For Sale? Congressional
Voting on Recent Trade Bills, 105 PUB. CHOICE 79 (2000); Stacy Gordon, All
Votes Are Not CreatedEqual: Campaign Contributions and Critical Votes, 63 J.
POL. 249 (2003).
8. Thomas Stratman, Campaign Contributions and CongressionalVoting:
Does the Timing of ContributionsMatter?, 77 REV. ECON. & STAT. 127 (1995).
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campaign contributions influence congressional voting behavior
must address the issue of whether campaign contributions are
endogenous in the vote equation. The issue is whether
contributions influence the voting behavior or
' 9 whether the
expected voting behavior influences contributions."
This mandate applies equally to all studies addressing the
question of whether campaign contributions influence the
decisions of judges. Thus, both studies seriously call into question
P&L's conclusion of a causal link between contributions and
judicial decisions. After Chappell's work, essentially every serious
work on the topic must address the fact that there are at least two
relationships of interest, not one as their article implies. When
there are two sets of decision-makers (judges and contributors),
both must be modeled. To assume that one can ignore the decision
calculus of contributors is a fundamental error in both the use of
economic theory and econometrics. It is difficult to argue that
contributors do not take into account judicial temperament and
philosophy when deciding how to allocate their scarce dollars.
And, it is naive to assume that a judge's temperament and judicial
philosophy cannot be known in advance.
Thus, any serious attempt to address the impact of
contributions on the decisions of judges must use econometric
techniques that recognize the two-way causality. Assuming away
the simultaneity issue, as P&L implicitly have done, represents a
fundamentally fatal error in their analysis. The possibility that
differences among judges in their decisions or judicial philosophies
can influence how campaign contributions are distributed is
conceptually identical to the influence legislator predispositions
have on the distribution of campaign contributions. This has been
well-recognized in economics for decades. For example, Grier and
Munger show that specific characteristics of individual legislators
attract contributions from some, but not necessarily all interest
groups.' 0 That is, interest groups that value certain characteristics
contribute to the campaigns of legislators who possess those
characteristics.
With just a cursory review of the literature, P&L would have
found these studies and would have been aware of Stratman's view
that all studies must address this issue as central to their analysis.
Their failure to even cite these studies, much less address the key
issue, reveals a fundamental flaw in their study. However, that is
not the only important issue raised by the P&L paper. Many
9. Id. at 127.
10. See generally Kevin Grier & Michael Munger, The Impact of Legislator
Attributes on Interest-GroupCampaign Contributions,7 J. LAB. RES. 349 (1986).
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economic studies can miss a key item in the literature or err in
methodology. But, over time, subsequent research corrects the
errors if the study is deemed interesting or research scholars may
simply ignore the study, which implicitly deems it as having little
value to the discipline.
However, the P&L paper is not the typical academic study. The
methodology chosen by P&L, which entirely ignores the
simultaneity issue, focuses on voting by specific justices in the
Louisiana Supreme Court. The authors conclude that contributions
influenced the voting behavior of at least three justices in particular
and suggest that it may also be true for the entire court. 1 By
naming specific justices and incorrectly asserting that they have
produced statistically valid evidence that campaign contributions
influenced decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court, the authors
risk tarnishing the reputations of longstanding judges with no
scientifically valid evidence to support their claims. In this case,
the profession's process of simply ignoring poor scholarship or
correcting it over time cannot prevent the immediate damage to
reputations that the P&L study will produce under the guise of
academic research.
This Critique proceeds by first discussing the problems in
P&L's methodology. We then focus on conclusions drawn by the
authors and the language used to describe the results.
III. PROBLEMS IN THE PALMER AND LEVENDIS METHODOLOGY
A. The Effect ofJudicialPhilosophy on the Decision to Contribute
The key problem in P&L's methodology is that it fails to
adequately model the contributor's decision to donate to
campaigns. In fact, the results from P&L's analysis fall apart under
closer inspection. To understand the problem, suppose P&L had
performed a similar study focusing on whether U.S. Supreme
Court Justices were unduly influenced by the support of pro-life or
pro-choice groups during confirmation hearings. It would come as
no surprise to find that the Christian Coalition and other pro-life
groups supported (contributed heavily to) Justices such as Clarence
Thomas, while pro-choice groups voiced opposition to Justice
Thomas but showed support for (contributed heavily to) Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg. When one later looks at voting records by
justices, the status of plaintiff and defendant may vary. However,
regardless of the plaintiff and defendant in the case, Justice
Thomas is more likely to favor restricting abortion rights than
11.

Palmer & Levendis, supra note 1, at 1314.
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Justice Ginsburg. Does this imply that the decisions of the Justices
are unduly influenced by support of pro-life or pro-choice groups
during the confirmation hearings? No, it simply shows that the
judicial temperament and philosophy of justices on this one issue
were known by the two groups and therefore influenced their
support decisions.
Chappell's seminal article pointed out that the same idea holds
true for campaign contributions.1 2 If the U.S. Supreme Court were
elected and received campaign contributions, would one really
expect pro-life groups to contribute to Justice Ginsburg? If not,
then one is sure to only observe financial contributions to Justice
Ginsburg's campaign by pro-choice groups. However, the fact that
Justice Ginsburg tends to rule in favor of pro-choice positions has
nothing to do with unfair influence by contributors. It just reflects
the fact that the Justice votes as anticipated in those cases.
Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that it was her "voting
behavior" that influenced the decisions of contributors. Furthermore,
it is naYve at best to assume, as P&L do, that one can control for
judicial philosophy across a broad range of issues on the basis
1 3 of the
number of times a justice rules for the plaintiff or defendant.
B. Improper StatisticalMethodology
Additionally, Kevin Tully and Phelps Gay's rebuttal of the
P&L study found a significant number of potentially serious errors
in the data P&L constructed for their study. 14 It appears that the
authors may have misclassified almost 20% of their 186 cases-an
incredibly high error rate for any empirical study. 15 Conclusions
based on this data set must be called into question (leaving aside
the issue of methodology). 16 An error rate of this magnitude is
unacceptable for a scientific study and raises questions about the
care taken with other parts of their study.
12. Chappell, supra note 6, at 79.
13. Palmer and Levendis, supra note 1, at 1303. See also Kevin Tully & E.
Phelps Gay, The Louisiana Supreme Court Defended.- A Rebuttal of The
Louisiana Supreme Court in Question: An Empirical and Statistical Study of the
Effects of Campaign Money on the Judicial Function, 69 LA. L. REV. 281
(2009).
14. Tully & Gay, supra note 13, at 286-287.
15. Id. at 287.
16. Another question arises about why P&L chose to eliminate all cases in
which no dissent was present. Palmer & Levendis, supra note 1, at 1297. If
judges were influenced by donations, a unanimous decision would be a rare
event. By eliminating all such cases, P&L may have exaggerated their finding of
judicial bias.
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Given the discussion above, it is not surprising that the P&L
paper finds positive correlations between contributions and votes
when the test the relationship with more intensive statistical
analysis.' Their logit results suffer from the same criticisms that
apply to Table 3 of their article. Fortunately, Chappell's studX
developed the appropriate econometric tools to address this issue,
which was extended in later work such as Stratman. 19 While the
description of the construction of the data set and the specification
of the logit model is vague, 20 it is clear that P&L relied on a single
equation logit model. This is the fatal flaw in their methodology.
To understand the problem, note that P&L use a specification
similar to the single equation specification of Durden and
Silberman.2 1 Chappell's article was to a large extent written as a
critique of the Durden and Silberman study. In essence, Chappell
noted that randomly assigning contributors to a candidate ignores
the fact that donors tend to contribute to candidates with similar
viewpoints. 22 To use our earlier analogy, pro-choice groups would
only contribute to candidates viewed as supporting the pro-choice
position. Econometrically, this means that the level of
contributions is jointly endogenous and mandates the estimation of
a second equation.
Chappell correctly addresses the econometric problems using a
logit-Tobit approach. 3 Using data from several congressional
votes, Chappell's research shows that the single equation model is
biased. 4 In Chappell's words:
FIML estimates of the simultaneous probit-Tobit model
suggest that the effects of campaign contributions on voting
are smaller than single equation probit estimates would
indicate. We are generally unable to conclude that
contributions have a significant impact on voting decisions;
apparently votes are most often decided on the basis of
personal ideology or the preferences of constituents. These
findings differ markedly from the earlier results of Durden

17. Palmer & Levendis, supra note 1, at 1309.
18. Chappell, supra note 6, at 77.
19. Stratman, supra note 8.
20. Palmer & Levendis, supra note 1, at 1306-08.
21. Jonathan I. Silberman & Garey C. Durden, Determining Legislative
Preferenceson the Minimum Approach, 84 J. POL. ECON. 317 (1976).
22. Chappell, supra note 6, at 79.
23. Id. at 77.
24. Id. at 83.
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and Silberman, whose single equation models showed
25 a
substantial impact of contributions on voting decisions.
The findings of Chappell and the sample size of the P&L study
strongly suggest that all of the evidence of a relationship between
contributions and voting by justices would disappear if the correct
probit-Tobit specification was used. Given the standard
econometric approaches at the time and computing power
available, Durden and Silberman's estimation of a single equation
model was to be expected. However, P&L's choice of an almost
identical single equation model more than forty years later is
inexcusable.
Less troubling results in the P&L study might be found in
Table 5.26 Though Stratman's work is not cited, P&L do come to a
similar conclusion-timing of contributions may matter.2 7 That is,
more recent contributions might have a larger impact on voting
behavior than contributions made in the past. Stratmann used a
three equation model-a probit equation for voting and two Tobit
during the year
equations for predicting the contributions of donors
28
of the vote and the two years prior to the vote.
P&L state that at least ninety of the contributions in their data
set occurred within one year of a decision. 29 Though Stratman's
methodology used a system of three equations, his work does offer
hope that a single equation model using recent contributions might
provide useful results. However, instead of using only those
contributions within the last year, P&L use all contributions over a
fourteen year period (1992 to 2006) and simply discount the
contributions at a 5% rate for every year between the contribution
and decision. 30 This methodology makes it impossible to determine
whether the results are driven by the recent contributions or the
older contributions, particularly since the timing of contributions is
likely to vary across justices. The use of a 5% discount to equate
historical donations to donations in the case year is arbitrary.
Further, the decay effect may not be linear. This figure should be
estimated as part of a system of equations.
Interestingly, P&L issue a rather puzzling disclaimer in
footnote 14 of their paper related to this issue. Footnote 14 of the
P&L piece states: "It is worth observing that this Article does not
claim that there is a cause and effect relationship between prior
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
Palmer & Levendis, supra note 1, at 1312.
Id.
Stratmann, supra note 8, at 128-29.
Palmer & Levendis, supra note 1, at 1311.
See id.at 1296, 1312.

314

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 69

donations and judicial votes in favor of donors' positions. It asserts
instead that there is evidence
of a statistically significant
31
correlation between the two."
In layman's terms, this footnote states that the authors make no
assertion with regard to whether the correlations imply that
contributions affect voting behavior or instead simply reflect the
fact that contributions tend to flow to those that share the donor's
point of view. Apparently the authors completely miss the
significance of this footnote. To any trained econometrician, this
footnote states that the article makes no assertion that it contains
statistical evidence that contributions affect voting behavior of
justices. Thus, this footnote is disingenuous and cannot be squared
with their stated conclusions in the text of the paper-conclusions
that are in fact based upon an assumption about cause and effect.
Irrespective of the claim in footnote 14, the econometric technique
used in the paper requires the authors to make an assumption about
cause and effect, ipsofacto.3 2
In light of footnote 14, the rest of the paper is completely
confusing. The majority of the paper either implicitly or explicitly
interprets statistical correlations as implying a causal relationship
where donations influence voting. 33 If P&L were really taking an
agnostic position on causality, the paper should clearly discuss the
alternative explanation discussed above. Given that footnote, all
results should be discussed in terms of both possible explanations.
P&L's repeated assertions that donations influence voting
behavior directly contradict footnote 14. In light of these
assertions, it is very surprising that P&L do not employ the logitTobit model that was introduced by Chappell34 over twenty-five
years ago to test for evidence of such a causal relationship.
IV. CONCLUSION

This Critique evaluates the P&L Tulane Law Review article
which asserts that it contains evidence that campaign contributions
have influenced voting behavior of Louisiana Supreme Court
justices. The key goal of this Critique is to point out fundamental
flaws in P&L's analysis and to point other scholars to the
appropriate literature describing the correct way to do a study of

31. Id. at 1294 n.14.
32. In simple terms, decisions are modeled as the dependent variable and
donations are treated as the independent variable.
33. See, e.g., Palmer & Levendis, supra note 1, at 1292, 1314.
34. Chappell, supra note 6, at 77-78.
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this sort. Chappell's seminal work and later work by Stratman
provide the basic methodology for this type of research.
The P&L paper is written as if the authors are discovering new
problems and attempting to address them using a new approach. In
fact, economists recognized these problems over thirty years ago
and developed solutions, which have been thoroughly vetted in
leading journals.
P&L's failure to investigate the literature leads them to employ
"modem statistical analysis"'37 that Chappell dismissed over
twenty-five years ago as inadequate for this problem. The authors
seem to grasp this problem in footnote 1438 where they note that
their paper will make no assertion with regard to causality. In
essence, footnote 14 states that P&L will not interpret results found
in the paper as implying that contributions influence voting
behavior. Yet, they repeatedly infer cause and effect despite the
admonition contained in footnote 14.
In summation, P&L's failure to investigate this literature leaves
them with an article consisting essentially of totally invalid
statistical results and unsubstantiated assertions. These failures
may be compounded by errors made in the construction of their
data-an error rate that is unacceptably large. We hope that future
research using more careful econometric analysis might be able to
provide more useful evidence on the topic of interest.

35. Id.
36. Stratman, supra note 8.
37. Palmer & Levendis, supra note 1, at 1314.
38. Idat1294n.14.
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